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Abstract 
Thailand and the Philippines face similar 
security issues, including separatist violence 
in their southern provinces. However, the 
developmental paths of the two countries 
and the governments’ reactions to the mi-
nority ethno-religious separatist movements, 
the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the 
Philippines, have varied greatly. In Thai-
land, the government’s desire to create a 
singular national identity from mixed ethnic 
and religious backgrounds has created peri-
ods of forced assimilation tempered by at-
tempts at conciliation. Conversely, the Phil-
ippines continued colonial policies of eco-
nomic and political oppression of the Moro 
but created the institutions necessary for 
social pluralism. The differing policies of 
the Thai and Filipino governments have 
shaped the orientation of the separatist 
movements within the countries. Currently, 
the size and power of the MILF in the Phil-
ippines has forced the government to at-
tempt peace talks with the group. However, 
in Thailand the reclusive nature of the 
BRN‑C remains hinders communications 
with the Thai government. This paper dem-
onstrates that the actions taken by the gov-
ernments of Thailand and the Philippines 
have fostered current separatist and terrorist 
movements. Addressing these problems will 
require state policies that reflect pluralism 
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   Thailand Philippines 




Secularization of schools 
Reaction from govern-
ment 
Relied on military rather 
than political action to 
deal with violence 
Peace agreements and 
ceasefires 
  
Direct political action 
Separatist groups BRN and BRN-C 
  
Goals murky at best, 
leaders hide in country-
side 
MNLF and MILF 
  
Well known leaders and 
goals 
Size of groups Exact numbers unknown, 
estimated at times as low 
as 300 to 500 active 
members 
At peak 30,000 estimated 
members 
Focus of groups/ conflict Focus of group un-
known. 
  
The conflict is both relig-
iously and ethnically 
based 
MILF aimed for a 
broader political goal 
based on the ethnic/
religious identity of the 
Moro 
Class issues Low overall country out-
put/wages until industrial 
revolution in late 1980s 
Government reallocation 
of ancestral Moro land to 
Christians 
(cycle of poverty) 
Regional affect Malay have appealed to 
Malaysian government 
for aid in crisis 
Connection with Muslim 
community in Sabah and 
Borneo 
Outside funding Some claim Jamaa 
Islamiya connection to 
the BRN but the BRN 
and scholars deny these 
claims 
Malaysian government 
(weapons, transport, etc.) 




Top down structure in 
the BRN-C, with a mili-
tary and political wing 
Loosely knit with some 
infrastructure including a 
central committee and 
the BMA (Bangsa Moro 
Army) 
Religious demographics 94% Buddhist 
5% Muslim 
<1% Christian, 




Sikh, or animist 
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 Introduction  
 Thailand and the Philippines 
are currently experiencing similar se-
curity concerns, including separatist 
violence in their southern provinces. 
The violence stems from minority ethno‑-
religious groups, namely the Malay in Thai-
land and the Moro in the Philippines. De-
spite largely similar histories, the develop-
mental paths of the separatist movements 
and governmental responses of the two 
countries have greatly affected their reac-
tions and level of success with the separatist 
movements. The focus in Thailand on iden-
tity issues, and the government’s inability to 
create lasting and stable institutions through 
which to mediate identity issues, has left the 
Malay with few official avenues through 
which to express their problems. Due to this, 
some Malay have begun to work outside of 
the system in separatist groups. However, in 
the Philippines the government’s economic 
oppression has been tempered by a political 
readiness to mitigate societal issues. That 
has enabled separatist groups to be open 
about their leadership and aims, which has 
lead to negotiations and attempted peace 
treaties with the government. 
History before the Modern States  
 The creation of Thailand and the 
Philippines as unified states only occurred in 
the early twentieth century. Prior to this, 
Thailand was a series of provinces ruled by 
local leaders and the Philippines was a col-
ony of Spain. Even after the Philippines be-
came a unified state, it was a colony of the 
United States until 1946. However, the his-
tory of the Malay and Moro date back much 
further than the creation of Thailand and the 
Philippines, which has had an impact on the 
current separatist movements. 
Thailand  
The beginnings of modern Thai his-
tory can be traced to the eleventh through 
thirteenth centuries when the ethnic group, 
the Thai, began migrating south from China 
and controlling regions in China as well as 
in the Northern provinces of modern‑day 
Thailand (Wyatt 2003, 30). However, prior 
to the Thai arrival, three ethnic groups, the 
Mon, Khmer, and the Malay, resided in the 
area of Thailand and controlled independent 
provinces. Of these three ethnic groups, only 
the Malay in the south were animists, and 
the Mon and Khmer, sometimes placed to-
gether as the Mon-Khmer, were Buddhist 
(Wyatt 2003, 20). The Thai created local 
leadership similar to that already existing in 
the provinces. In time, the Mon and Khmer 
assimilated with the Thai, as they shared a 
common faith and Chinese heritage. Mean-
while, the southern provinces of Thailand, 
Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun were con-
trolled under the local area of Malacca until 
1511 (Harish 2006, 50). At this point, the 
Portuguese had overtaken Malacca and all of 
the provinces were placed under the watch 
of the Kingdom of Siam (Thai government). 
This new arrangement included the pay-
ments of tribute to the king, but the prov-
inces were allowed to retain local leadership, 
often called rajas or kings (Harish 2006, 50). 
Around this same time, trade boomed in the 
southern provinces and with it brought the 
Islamic religion (Islam 1998, 443). It 
quickly became the dominant faith in the 
south by the late fifteenth century, and being 
Malay and being Muslim became synony-
mous.  For the next two centuries, the three 
southern provinces would continue to  
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 govern themselves, occasionally 
engaging in skirmishes with the 
Siam government but never being un-
der direct control. 
In 1785, after numerous rebellions 
and refusals to pay tribute, the King of 
Siam overthrew the raja of the provinces 
and placed them under direct Siam control 
(Islam 1998, 443). Despite being under the 
control of the Thai government, the raja re-
tained some local status and could be influ-
ential in the southern provinces. This would 
end when in 1901, when under pressure 
from the British government the Siamese 
government created an official administra-
tive body to rule the “area of the seven prov-
inces” (Harish 2006, 51). In essence this cre-
ated a “unified” Thailand (than called Siam), 
so that the king had official control over all 
of the provinces of Thailand – thus finally 
ending the power of local southern leaders. 
From this point until 1932, with the 
marginalization of the king and the creation 
of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay had 
virtually no representation in the govern-
ment. With the establishment of a democ-
racy in Thailand, the Malay won some mini-
mal spots in the National Assembly and Par-
liament (Harish 2006, 52). It would seem 
that Thailand was beginning a promising 
new government, including plurality in and 
representation from all provinces. However, 
in 1938, the fledgling democracy was de-
posed in a coup and Thailand was forced 
under the control of the military (composed 
mainly of Thai Buddhists). This would dras-
tically change the quality of life for the Ma-
lay in the south and affect relations between 
the Thai Buddhists and the Malay through-
out the twentieth century. 
The Philippines 
The Philippines faced a similar early 
historical path to that of Thailand. The is-
lands that compose the Philippines were in-
habited by many ethnic groups, collectively 
termed Malayo-Polynesian (Islam 1998, 
444). They were governed by local leaders, 
often termed sultans. The Moro resided 
largely in the southern province of Min-
danao. No unified state of the Philippines 
existed and outside influences from Malay-
sia remained a force in political life. Simi-
larly to Thailand, Islam was introduced in 
the southern provinces in the early four-
teenth century through trade (Islam 1998, 
444). Soon it too became the dominant relig-
ion, most closely associated with the Moro. 
Shortly after Islam was introduced in the 
Philippines, the Spanish gained control of 
the southern provinces of Mindanao and 
Sulu (predominately Moro in composition) 
in 1565 (Islam 1998, 444). The Spanish 
never officially gained a mandate over these 
provinces but governed them as a colony 
anyway. This is exemplified most predomi-
nately in the attempts by the Spanish to con-
vert the Moro to Catholicism. Their efforts 
were largely unsuccessful so the Spanish 
began to “reallocate” Moro land to Spanish 
Catholics (and those they are able to con-
vert) in an attempt to forcibly change the 
religious and ethnic composition of the 
southern provinces.  
Despite the fact that the Philippines 
were never officially a Spanish territory, and 
that Spanish control was maintained largely 
only in the southern provinces of Mindanao 
and Sulu, the Spanish relinquished control of 
the Philippines to the United States in 1899 
as part of the Bates Treaty that ended the 
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 Spanish-American War. The Phil-
ippines would not gain independ-
ence until 1946, until that time the 
United States created the Manila Gov-
ernment to rule over the Philippines. 
During American rule in the Philippines, 
there was occasional conflict between the 
government and the Moro. This led to the 
creation of the Moro Province, encompass-
ing the provinces of Sulu and Mindanao, a 
special administrative area created to pre-
emptively quell any growing dissidence 
(Magdalena 1977, 300). The Manila Gov-
ernment claimed that it was actively trying 
to redistribute land back to the Moro people, 
whose land was stripped from them under 
the Spanish and were working as tenant 
farmers on the land. However, in reality lit-
tle ancestral land was given back to the 
Moro and tenant farming remained the pre-
dominant practice until the 1960s, and not 
until the late 1980s did any significant land 
redistribution take place (Noble 1976a, 406). 
This created a system under which the Moro 
differed religiously, ethnically, geographi-
cally, and financially from the majority of 
Filipinos. 
Beginnings of Separatist Movements  
 Separatist tensions in both Thailand 
and the Philippines began to emerge in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, as a reaction to 
government policies. In Thailand, the mili-
tary coup in 1938 created an unstable politi-
cal atmosphere in which the pattern of at-
tempted forced assimilation by the govern-
ment on the Malay became an increasing 
issue. This included the eradication of the 
Malay language in schools, regulated cur-
riculum in punohs (religious schools), and 
government pressure for Malays to take Thai 
names (Harish 2006, 52).  Haji Sulong be-
came the leader of the first separatist move-
ment in Thailand, the Islamic Council of the 
Pattani Province, sending a list of demands 
to the Thai government in April 1947 
(Christie 1996, 183). Among the demands 
were a separate court that would recognize 
the Islamic faith for the basis of the law, for 
money derived from the southern provinces 
to be utilized in those provinces, and for the 
restoration of the Malay language in schools 
as well as for it to be the official language of 
the three southern provinces (Islam 1998, 
444). Sulong and some of his supporters 
were arrested in 1948 for treason, resulting 
in a steady stream of violence for the re-
mainder of the year ending with the declara-
tion of a state of emergency in the southern 
provinces that would last for a decade. In 
1959, as the emergency was ending, the 
BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan 
Patani) was being formed by Tengku Abdul 
Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong’s in the 
1940s (Islam 1998, 446). The BNPP was the 
precursor to the current separatist groups the 
BRN and the PULO, its aims included an 
independent Islamic state (Islam 1998, 446). 
 In the Philippines, the Magsaysay 
administration continued the policy of strip-
ping the Moro of their ancestral lands by 
hastening migration of northern Filipinos 
and Catholics into the southern regions 
(Noble 1976a, 406). The government 
claimed to undertake this movement to in-
crease production in the southern provinces, 
which were producing below capacity, and 
thus solve the problems that were arising 
from an increasing population and low pro-
ductivity levels (Noble 1976a, 406). How-
ever, this had a negative effect on the 
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 Moros, as the Catholics and north-
ern Filipinos soon became the ma-
jority in the south. A combination of 
Catholics and non‑Moro northerners 
thus gained control of the local govern-
ment positions and wealth in the region – 
and often over Moro land, as few of the 
Moros who lived and worked on their ances-
tral lands had legal documents to prove own-
ership (Noble 1976a, 407). This resulted in 
their land being taken by the Catholics and 
wealthier Filipinos who effectively con-
trolled the legal system in the south. The 
first coordinated separatist group formed as 
a reaction to the Corregidor Incident in 
1968. In March 1968, the Filipino govern-
ment was planning an attack on Sabah, Ma-
laysia. Sabah was a popular trading port that 
the government believed to be a smuggling 
area for Moros. In order to undertake the 
attack, the government constructed an all‑-
Moro military unit. However, as the Moro 
were actively engaged in trade in Sabah and 
many Moro had relatives there, the Moro 
soldiers refused their orders. The Thai offi-
cials claimed that the soldiers staged an up-
rising in which thirty Moro soldiers were 
killed. However, the incident was interpreted 
differently by the Moro, who believed that 
the government murdered the soldiers and 
purposefully attempted to send an all‑Moro 
unit to Sabah (Noble 1976a, 408). Following 
the incident, Udtog Matalam formed the first 
organized separatist movement, MIM 
(Muslim Independence Movement), which 
the government disbanded in 1970 (Noble 
1976a, 408). However, MIM was an impor-
tant precursor to a currently active separatist 
group, the MNLF (Moro National Liberation 
Front). 
  The movements took different paths 
after this point in time. In Thailand, periodic 
uprisings were undertaken by various 
groups, but there was not consistent separa-
tist violence from one group until a larger 
undertaking in the 1980s and later the most 
recent violence occurring since 2004. Con-
versely, in the Philippines in the 1960s sev-
eral separatist groups emerged and became 
staples in the conflict until the present. 
Modern Separatist Groups in Thailand 
 The two main separatist groups that 
currently operate in Thailand are the BRN 
(National Revolutionary Front) and the 
PULO (Patani United Liberation Organiza-
tion). The BRN retained the religious under-
pinnings of the BNPP, as well as responding 
to economic issues developing in the south-
ern provinces. The decline in the rubber 
market in the 1960s disproportionately af-
fected the southern provinces and thus dis-
proportionately impoverished Muslims as 
compared to the rest of Thailand (Islam 
1998, 447). The BRN remains a largely se-
cretive group, the leaders are unknown and 
the group rarely discussed its goals until re-
cently, when it declared that it is attempting 
to create an independent state through revo-
lution.  The PULO, unlike the BRN, is secu-
lar in nature but still aims to create an inde-
pendent Pattani state. The group was formed 
by college graduates who had received their 
degrees abroad, only to come back to Thai-
land and be unable to work as no one would 
hire them (Tan-Mullins 2006, 146). This has 
caused some graduates to leave Thailand, 
and a marked absence of educated Malay in 
leadership positions in the Thai government. 
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 Modern Separatist Groups in the 
Philippines 
 Almost directly after the dis-
banding of MIM, the MNLF, the youth 
branch of MIM, came to the forefront. 
It directly outlined its political goals as 
well as the reasons for the formation of the 
group. Openness and clarity would remain a 
characteristic of the MNLF, as the leaders of 
the group are well known and have through-
out the struggle been in periodic discussions 
with the government. While the Moro iden-
tify based on religion as well as culture, the 
MNLF focused on broader shared goals, in-
cluding economic disparities in the southern 
provinces and government failures to re-
spond to inequality. In doing so, the MNLF 
created a larger scope and support base for 
their cause than did Thai separatist groups. 
As a result, when the government declared 
martial law in October 1972, the MNLF had 
support not only in the Philippines but also 
in Malaysia which actively funded the group 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Noble 1976a, 411). 
Differences in Separatist Movements  
 The separatist movements in Thai-
land and the Philippines share some similar 
qualities, including a minority Muslim eth-
nic group, movements originating at ap-
proximately the same time, and semi-defined 
goals for independent states/regions. How-
ever, the orientation of the modern dominant 
groups in each country has affected the na-
ture of the conflict within the country. The 
BRN retains a pure Islamic message, which 
has limited its membership (i.e. the PULO). 
Additionally, the relative silence and secrecy 
of the group has hindered the possibility of 
communication with the government. This 
has created an atmosphere of suspicion in 
the southern provinces of Thailand, where 
even Malays living in the southern provinces 
often remark that they are unsure of who is 
or is not a member of the BRN (Tan-Mullins 
2006, 145). Conversely, membership in the 
MNLF has exceeded the tens of thousands at 
its peak, with the names and faces of top 
leaders well known throughout the country. 
The broader message of the MNLF has al-
lowed for compromise, as seen in the recent 
peace talks with the government that re-
sulted in the signing of a peace treaty.  De-
spite the Filipino courts’ failure to approve 
the treaty and subsequent relapse of violence 
in August 2008, the leaders of the MNLF 
were willing and able to meet with and com-
promise on issues of importance to the 
Moro, Muslims, and people of the southern 
provinces. It is evident that the nature of the 
separatist organizations has influenced the 
level of success or failure the movements 
will have diplomatically; however, it has 
been the governments’ responses to the 
separatist movements that have influenced 
the severity of the groups and the violence 
that stems from them. 
Government Action in Thailand and the 
Philippines 
Action taken in part by the governments in 
Thailand and the Philippines has fueled 
separatist groups. In Thailand, the govern-
ment’s relentless pursuit of a national iden-
tity has caused the Malay to react by fighting 
relentlessly to maintain their cultural tradi-
tions. In the Philippines, the government’s 
misappropriation of land left the Moro un-
derrepresented politically and devastated 
financially. However, it is the capacity of the 
government to manage these issues that has 
most directly affected the ability of the  
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 government to mitigate separatist 
violence. 
Initial Government  Responses to 
Separatist Movements 
 In the Philippines, major separa-
tist organization began after the Corregi-
dor Incident of 1968 and the subsequent 
consolidation of President Marcos power in 
1972. One of Marcos’s first actions as presi-
dent was to declare martial law in the south-
ern provinces. This included a massive reas-
signment of troops, with over 70 percent sta-
tioned in the southern provinces. Addition-
ally, from 1972 through 1978 Marcos con-
solidated and strengthened his power as 
president. This included the firing of over 
2000 government positions, a referendum 
that allowed him to appoint local officials, 
and Marcos holding both the positions of 
president and prime minister (Noble 1976b, 
180). Despite the increased power of Mar-
cos, he chose to negotiate with the MNLF 
leaders. A ceasefire was quickly established 
and maintained. Beginning in 1975, the 
MNLF leaders presented their goals to the 
Islamic Conference in Jeddah (OIC). The 
MNLF wanted a politically autonomous re-
gion, which would be comprised of thirteen 
southern provinces including all of Min-
danao and the Sulu archipelago (Noble 
1976b, 181). President Marcos responded by 
offering autonomy but not full independ-
ence; instead, four regions would be con-
structed from the thirteen provinces. Each 
region would have a commissioner that 
would be directly under his (Marcos’s) au-
thority as well as the placement of Muslims 
in additional government positions focused 
on economic and social development (Noble 
1976b, 181). The general terms were ac-
cepted by both the MNLF and Marcos. 
However, as the fine details of the peace 
agreement were being negotiated, the MNLF 
called for full autonomy and the implemen-
tation of Muslim leaders and law in the 
southern provinces. The government refused 
to accept these terms since in some of the 
thirteen proposed regions Muslims did not 
constitute the majority. The reason that Mus-
lims did not constitute a majority in all of 
the southern provinces was a result of the 
Catholic “land reallocation” pursued by the 
government during Spanish colonization. 
Following a vote, only ten of the thirteen 
regions voted for autonomy and the Tripoli 
peace agreement subsequently fell apart. 
Hence, colonial policies continued to not 
only affect Filipino society but also hinder 
peaceful coexistence. 
Despite the failure to complete a 
peace agreement between the MNLF and the 
Filipino government, an important precedent 
was set by the Marcos administration. Even 
though Marcos governed the Philippines in 
an authoritarian manner and amassed exorbi-
tant control by undemocratic means, the 
government was willing to negotiate with 
the separatist groups in order to attempt to 
create peace in the Philippines. Working 
through the OIC created a positive dialogue 
between the government and the separatist 
leaders. Marcos was successful in establish-
ing a five‑year period of relative peace, es-
pecially following the 1976 ceasefire. This 
precedent allowed future negotiations and 
discussions between the government and 
main separatist groups in the Philippines, 
which has contributed to peace talks be-
tween the government and the MNLF for the 
last three decades. The value that Marcos 
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 placed on negotiations became in-
formally institutionalized in a sense, 
carrying through to future administra-
tions and creating what would become a 
mechanism for separatist groups to air 
their grievances and communicate their 
goals; in essence, this created additional 
political avenues for separatists as opposed 
to using purely violent means to communi-
cate with the government. 
Thailand, instead of responding both 
diplomatically and militarily as the Philip-
pines did, chose only military means to re-
spond to separatism. This resulted in a mark-
edly different outcome. With aid from the 
United States, Thailand began counterinsur-
gency efforts including the reassignment of 
troops to the southern provinces. In 1974, 
the ISOC (Internal Security Operational 
Command) was formed as a subdivision of 
the military to directly combat separatist ac-
tion; which continues to operate in Thailand 
and the southern provinces. During this 
time, Thailand was politically unstable; stu-
dent organization was squashed by the mili-
tary followed by a military coup in 1976 
(Morell and Samudavanija 1979, 319-20). 
This, along with increasing tensions between 
the military and the CPT (Communist Party 
of Thailand), created a government unable 
and unwilling to negotiate with separatist 
groups.  In response, separatist violence in-
creased throughout the 1970s, particularly 
among the PULO. Unlike in the Philippines, 
in which separatist leaders openly communi-
cated with the government and their names 
and positions were well known throughout 
the country, in Thailand an environment of 
secrecy abounded. This was evident not only 
in the main separatist groups, the PULO and 
the BRN, but also in other politically moti-
vated groups such as the CPT. Both the 
separatist groups and the CPT retreated into 
the hills of southern Thailand. Just as the 
peace talks with Marcos placed value on 
open communication, so too did the actions 
of the Thai military in the 1970s; however, 
the Thai government created an environment 
in which identifying, let alone negotiating 
with, separatist groups became elusive. 
Government Responses to Separatist 
Movements in the 1980s 
After the failed peace negotiations in 
the Philippines of the early 1970s, violence 
once again began to increase throughout the 
early 1980s particularly as corruption in-
creased in the Marcos administration and 
economic and social issues went unresolved. 
However, in 1986 Marcos was ousted during 
the four‑day February Revolution, also re-
ferred to as the EDSA (Epifanio de los San-
tos Avenue) Revolution (Villegas 1987, 
194). The end of the revolution was accom-
plished through the resignation of Marcos 
and a new democratically elected govern-
ment coming to power under President 
Corazon Aquino (Villegas 1987, 195). 
Aquino established a platform based on eco-
nomic growth and an end to the insurgency; 
she began to recreate the stability necessary 
for these two goals to be accomplished. This 
included the reinstatement of civil liberties 
such as the writ of habeas corpus, freeing of 
political prisoners, and face‑to‑face meet-
ings with the leaders of the MNLF (Villegas 
1987, 196-97). Additionally, Aquino made 
efforts to renegotiate the peace agreement 
originally proposed under Marcos. The Re-
public Act 6734 put the original peace 
agreement back up for vote in a referendum 
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 in 1989; however, only four of the 
provinces voted for the act (Rabasa 
and Chalk 2001, 92). Despite only 
four of the thirteen provinces voting in 
favor of the referendum, the ARMM 
(Autonomous Region of Muslim Min-
danao) was created in 1990. The ARMM 
operates as an autonomous government; the 
governments of the four provinces that voted 
in favor of inclusion are under the ARMM 
(Bertrand 2000, 40). It may appear as if the 
MNLF had reached its goal of an autono-
mous Mindanao and would subsequently no 
longer act as a separatist group. However, 
the group deemed the inclusion of only four 
of the thirteen provinces unacceptable and it 
continued to exist and communicate with the 
government. 
The new policies of the Filipino gov-
ernment in the 1980s focused on tempering 
the insurgency through means other than 
martial law or direct military involvement. 
Instead Aquino focused on issues of stability 
throughout the country that were necessary 
for a functioning democracy, including 
greater institutional capacity after the cen-
tralized power under Marcos. Within a year 
of the revolution, the economy in the Philip-
pines had improved and Aquino actively 
worked to improve the Philippines’ image 
abroad as well as to reduce the Philippines’ 
external debt (Villegas 1987, 201).  This 
policy was overall effective in reducing the 
amount of widespread violence from separa-
tist groups. While some violent outbreaks 
continued in the southern provinces, there 
was a clear reduction in the amount and se-
verity of attacks. 
During the 1980s, a secondary sepa-
ratist group came to the forefront in the Phil-
ippines, when the MILF (Moro Islamic Lib-
eration Front), an offshoot of the MNLF 
gained a following. This later complicated 
communication with the government, as the 
government was accustomed to negotiating 
with the MNLF and on several occasions 
failed to include the MILF in the discus-
sions, which only aided in fueling violence 
from the MILF. 
There was a significant decrease in 
violence in Thailand in the 1980s. This was 
due in part to the actions of General Prem 
Tinsulanonda as prime minister (1980 to 
1988) to liberalize and create institutional-
ized changes in Thailand (Melvin 2007, 34). 
These changes were facilitated by an ex-
panding economy and rapid industrialization 
in Thailand. Prior to the 1980s Thailand had 
relied on the export of agricultural products, 
resulting in Thailand having some of the 
lowest wages in the region and widespread 
poverty (Hussey 1993, 14). While the South-
ern Malay Provinces remained largely en-
gaged in agriculture, the significant gains 
Thailand made beginning in 1985, led it to 
be dubbed “Asia’s fifth tiger” (Hussey 1993, 
14). With expanding economic power came 
an increase in educational funding and po-
litical awareness, which had begun to be-
come evident in the 1970s during the Octo-
ber Revolution, with the increase in student 
political activity and the creation of the CPT 
(Paribatra 1993, 882). The media became 
freer to operate independently of the govern-
ment, political parties grew and expanded, 
and there was the creation of a middle class 
in Thailand (Paribatra 1993, 883). These 
represent positive changes in Thailand, in 
which legitimate institutions existed through 
which Thai citizens could express their 
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 political beliefs. The freedom of 
the press is crucial in creating ac-
countability and transparency in a 
government. Additionally, increased 
political activity and political options 
(more political parties) allowed for a plu-
rality not yet seen in Thai politics. 
 In addition to political and social 
changes, changes were implemented to ad-
dressseparatist concerns in the southern 
provinces as well. A military-civilian court 
was established to allow Malay citizens to 
report crimes that occurred during the mili-
tary reign in the 1970s (Macan-Markar 
2006). This was done in an attempt to recon-
cile the egregious crimes committed during 
military rule including the “disappearance” 
of many Malay activists, the military impris-
onment of large groups of civilians, and the 
killing of suspected separatist sympathizers. 
The goal was to foster greater understanding 
between Thai Buddhists and Malays regard-
ing the political situation in the south. The 
creation of a court to address the problems 
of the Malay signified the changing role of 
the government in Thailand. The govern-
ment began to take political steps to institu-
tionalize the role of the southern provinces 
within the Thai government. 
 Prime Minister Tinsulanonda cre-
ated CPM 43, a new security taskforce. 
Unlike the security forces present in the 
south in the past, CPM 43 was subject to the 
constitution of Thailand and therefore could 
not hold civilians against Thai law (Melvin 
2007, 13). Not only had the manner in which 
the government ensured security in the south 
changed, but also the administration of the 
southern provinces was changed in 1981. In 
conjunction with CPM 43, the Southern Bor-
der Provinces Administration Centre, 
(SBPAC) was formed (Melvin 2007, 13). 
This allowed greater control of the southern 
provinces by local officials and established 
amnesty for former separatists. This was part 
of the new government push for political 
participation and legitimate institutions 
rather than focusing directly on the eradica-
tion of separatist groups. This was a clear 
sign of the increasing capacity of the gov-
ernment.  The Thai government had the ca-
pability not only to create institutions but 
also to ensure their success through nonmili-
tary means, a crucial aspect missing in state 
response prior to and after the 1980s. This 
had not been possible prior to this point in 
Thai history. However, the fragility of the 
emerging democracy was challenged in the 
early 1990s, when the plummeting economy 
in Thailand and a lack of full transparency 
by the government reversed the progress of 
the 1980s. 
Government Action in the 1990s 
 In 1988, Prem Tinsulanonda stepped 
down as prime minister and Chatichai 
Choonhavan became the first prime minister 
to be an elected member of Parliament 
(Neher 1992, 595). It appeared as if the de-
mocratic transition in Thailand would occur 
effectively and peacefully. However these 
prospects were set back in 1991 when a mili-
tary coup overthrew the elected Thai govern-
ment. The coup was unexpected and sur-
prised Thai government officials as well as 
the international community. There were 
several reasons why the coup occurred. With 
the increase in political parties and plurality 
in the 1980s came widespread factionalism 
in Thai politics. No one political party could 
hold a majority in parliament,  
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 so coalitions were necessary. How-
ever, coalition alliances changed 
quickly and the past problems of cor-
ruption still haunted Thailand. With the 
freedom of the press instituted under 
Tinsulanonda, the corruption was re-
ported on an almost daily basis. This, com-
bined with the frustration of the Thai public 
with the incapability/unwillingness of the 
government to institute policies to decrease 
the gap between the wealthy elites and the 
poor majority, led to discontent in the coun-
try. Thus, when the military coup occurred 
in 1991, there were no immediate protests to 
the overthrow of the elected government 
(Neher 1992, 596). 
The military coup was led by a group 
that called itself the National Peace Keeping 
Council, which appointed Anand Panyara-
chun as interim prime minister (Paribatra 
1993, 887). Panyarachun worked on creating 
a Thai constitution (which became effective 
in 1997) and economic reforms. Elections 
were scheduled for March 1992. The elec-
tions resulted in the appointment of General 
Suchinda Kraprayoon (a member of the Na-
tional Peace Keeping Council) as prime min-
ister. Tensions quickly flared as Kraprayoon 
was not an elected member of Parliament. 
The Prime Minister attempted to relieve ten-
sions by claiming that he would support an 
amendment to the constitution that Panyara-
chun had begun work on, that would make it 
necessary for the prime minister to be a 
member of Parliament. The coalition major-
ity supported the proposed amendment but 
stipulated that Kraprayoon should remain 
prime minister for the duration of his term. 
This resulted in what came to be known as 
Black May in Thailand (Paribatra 1993, 
888). Black May began on May 17, 1992 
and continued until May 20. Hundreds of 
thousands of Thai citizens protested the pre-
miership of Kraprayoon. The military ini-
tially responded by trying to violently sup-
press the protesters, resulting in approxi-
mately fifty deaths and hundreds of arrests. 
Under clear public scrutiny the coalition de-
cided to enact the amendment that would 
stipulate that the prime minister had to be an 
elected member of Parliament, thus, ending 
Kraprayoon’s term as Prime Minister 
(Shenon 1992). Anand Panyarachun, the in-
terim prime minister from the military coup, 
reinstated himself as prime minister. The 
military leaders of the Kraprayoon admini-
stration were removed from their positions, 
and relative peace returned to Thailand for a 
time (Paribatra 1993, 890). However, the 
problems that reigned during Choonhavan’s 
premiership continued, namely widespread 
poverty in the southern provinces, which 
continued to be ignored due to the political 
instability in the central government. 
Thailand faced a severe economic 
downturn in the late 1990s, along with many 
other Asian countries. The growth that had 
begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
created largely through foreign investments 
and loans. When the bubble on growth 
“burst” in the late 1990s, investors pulled 
out of Thailand and the government owed 
large amounts of money to outside investors 
(Pempel 1999, 149-150).  In addition, the 
gap between the elite and the poor in Thai-
land was never adequately addressed during 
Thailand’s economic growth; as such the 
poorest in Thailand were most effected by 
the downturn. During this time separatist 
violence in Thailand was almost  
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
144 
12
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 11
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/11
 nonexistent, leading some to be-
lieve that the groups were no longer 
active. However, despite the signing 
of the new constitution in 1997, democ-
ratic initiatives in Thailand were over-
turned with the premiership of Thaksin 
Shinawatra in 2001. 
Similarly to Thailand, the early 
1990s represented a time of relatively little 
separatist violence in the Philippines. After 
the February or People Power Revolution in 
1986, the subsequent administrations were 
considered to be legitimate by both the gen-
eral public in the Philippines as well as by 
the main separatist movements (the MNLF 
and the MILF) (Bertrand 2000, 38). Coin-
ciding with the precedent set by Marcos, the 
Ramos government attempted to reconvene 
peace talks with the MNLF. Despite the 
creation of the ARMM, the MNLF wanted 
more provinces to be included in the admin-
istrative region. Unlike Marcos’s administra-
tion, the new Filipino government was truly 
democratic and as such a lasting agreement 
seemed possible. Both the Filipino govern-
ment and the MNLF had confidence that the 
other would uphold their end of the peace 
talks. The Ramos government had shown 
that democracy was becoming entrenched in 
the Philippines and the MNLF gained legiti-
macy through their backing by the OIC 
(Bertrand 2000, 39).  These were the condi-
tions under which the 1996 Peace Agree-
ment was signed. 
The agreement was largely based off 
of the initial Tripoli Agreement set out by 
Marcos. An administrative council, the 
SPCPD was placed in charge of the execu-
tion of the agreement. The implementation 
of the agreement took place over a three‑-
year period in which members of the MNLF 
were given positions in the military as well 
as the police, in addition to top spots in the 
SPCPD. Then, after the establishment of the 
SPCPD, a consolidation of the SPCPD and 
the ARMM created one administrative body 
for the fourteen then‑independent provinces, 
after a vote by the fourteen provinces 
(Bertrand 2000, 42). In theory, the creation 
of these administrative bodies would create 
lasting institutions and a political framework 
through which separatist leaders could en-
gage politically. 
Problems began to emerge within the 
ARMM and the SPCPD shortly after their 
creation. Both have been plagued by mis-
management (in particular with regards to 
the budget), and the SPCPD had an uncer-
tain role. The SPCPD was set up to be a 
transitory organization; it was not created to 
remain a part of the administration of the 
ARMM. As such the SPCPD holds little real 
power; its function instead is to convene to 
make suggestions to the Filipino government 
(Bertrand 2000, 47). The ARMM has been 
accused of acting as the “implementing arm 
of the government” (Bertrand 2000, 48) as 
opposed to an administrative body that 
represents the interests of the local commu-
nities. 
There were several problems stem-
ming from the peace agreement that made 
the possibility of a lasting peace settlement 
unlikely. First, the MNLF has been steadily 
losing power in the southern provinces. With 
the relative peace of the 1990s and a legiti-
mate government, membership decreased. 
Additionally, the breakaway of the MILF 
(the military branch of the MNLF) left the 
MNLF with decreased military power as 
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 well as influence (due to decreased 
numbers). This made the MNLF 
eager to sign a peace agreement. Sec-
ond, only four provinces voted to join 
the ARMM in 1989 and the likelihood 
of the remaining provinces voting to join 
only a few years later was slim especially 
due to the decrease in separatist supporters. 
This limited participation made the creation 
of an actual autonomous region difficult. 
Also, the widespread corruption and ineffi-
ciency of the ARMM and the SPCPD made 
their success unlikely. These two factors to-
gether, a weakened MNLF and the limited 
number of provinces willing to join the 
ARMM, set the agreement up for failure. To 
complicate matters further, the MILF op-
posed the signing of the Peace Agreement. 
This was because the MILF claimed that the 
agreement failed to address the problem of 
the loss of Moro ancestral lands. Also, while 
they agree that it may have solved the prob-
lems of the MNLF, they believed that it did 
not address the true problems of the Moro 
people (which the MILF claimed to repre-
sent) (Bauzon 1999, 264). 
The Current State of Separatist  
Movements  
Amid the fallout of the problems of the 1996 
Peace Agreement, the 1998 elections were a 
large loss for the MNLF and a new president 
was elected, former Vice President Joseph 
Estrada. Estrada’s presidency set the back-
drop for the rising tensions in the Philip-
pines. Estrada stepped down as president in 
2000, facing allegations of payoffs from ille-
gal gambling. A resurgence in violence fol-
lowed, with an increase in violence and kid-
nappings in 2000. After Estrada stepped 
down as president, Vice President Gloria 
Arroyo became president of the Philippines 
(Montesano 2004, 94). Separatist violence 
continued to grow during Arroyo’s first 
term, with other political issues prohibiting 
the government from addressing separatist 
groups. The government was plagued with 
problems, including attacks by the Commu-
nist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on mili-
tary bases and continuing accusations of po-
litical corruption (Montesano 2004, 95-96). 
This corresponded with bombings by the 
MILF, the now more violent and powerful 
separatist group (Montesano 2004, 96). 
 Once again, peace talks were initi-
ated to try to put an end to the violence in 
the southern provinces. In late 2003 Arroyo 
met with the MILF, and not the MNLF, 
along with the OIC to attempt to put into 
place a ceasefire and initiate peace talks 
(Montesano 2004, 97). The peace talks re-
sulted in yet another peace agreement in the 
Philippines. In keeping with the pattern in 
the Philippines, in January 2005 the MILF 
fighters attacked government troops and the 
ceasefire was broken, resulting in another 
three years of violence (Montlake 2008).  
The most recent action in the Philippines 
maintains this pattern as well. In August 
2008, the Filipino government and the MILF 
leaders reached an agreement to expand the 
size of the ARMM. This would have solidi-
fied a “homeland” for the Moro. However 
the Filipino Supreme Court issued a ruling 
to block the signing of the agreement, as it 
was seen as possibly unconstitutional and 
called for a hearing in which both the gov-
ernment and the separatist leaders would 
speak (Montlake 2008). This action by the 
Supreme Court was deemed unacceptable by 
the MILF leaders and violence has once 
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 again marred the southern prov-
inces. Hundred of thousands of peo-
ple have been displaced and hundreds 
killed in the ensuing violence that con-
tinues as Filipino security forces at-
tempt to hunt down the MILF leaders. 
 Despite relative peace in the 1980s 
and 1990s in Thailand, the turn of the twenty
-first century saw a renewal of violence that 
had been dormant for thirty years. Following 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
Prime Minister Thaksin wanted to appear as 
if separatist violence had ended in Thailand 
as the United States announced a war on ter-
ror. Clearly, this was due to a fear of a U.S. 
invasion in Thailand as part of this war on 
terror. Thaksin attempted to eradicate indica-
tions of past separatism within Thailand 
(Storey 2008, 36). This included the disman-
tling of CPM 43 and the SBPAC, some of 
the only successful political institutions re-
lated to separatist violence Thailand had 
been able to create and maintain. Thaksin 
than installed local provincial leaders who 
would respond directly to him (Storey 2008, 
37). These actions taken by Thaksin under-
mined the positive democratic changes that 
had taken place in Thailand and created in-
stability with the removal of key institutions 
(i.e. CPM 43 and the SBPAC). Thaksin re-
turned to the Thai tradition of centralized 
democracy, in an attempt to increase the 
power of his political party Thai Rak Thai, 
which had received little support from the 
south in the previous elections (Bajoria and 
Zissis 2008). Renewed violence emerged in 
the south in January 2004, including daily 
assassinations and kidnappings. Thaksin re-
sponded by declaring martial law in the 
southern provinces. 
Thaksin quickly lost support as vio-
lence continued to wreak havoc on the coun-
try and in 2006 he was replaced in a military 
coup (Bajoria and Zissis 2008).  An interim 
prime minister was appointed and the 
SBPAC and CPM 43 were reinstalled. The 
Thai government attempted peace talks with 
separatist leaders for the first time. However, 
the government still does not know who the 
leaders or members of the BRN (BRN-C) 
and the PULO are, so secondary leaders of 
disbanded groups were consulted. Due to 
this, the peace talks did not occur with cur-
rent members of separatist groups, and as 
such the peace talks were not effective in 
resolving the current separatist violence. 
Violence continued and worsened in the 
southern provinces, peaking in 2007. There 
have been over 1,500 casualties since the 
fighting began again in 2004. Martial law 
continued in the southern provinces, with the 
military having full control of the region 
(Bajoria and Zissis 2008). This is a clear 
violation of the SPBAC, which is supposed 
to be in control of security in the south and 
has to follow Thai laws. Under martial law, 
the military does not have to comply with 
Thai laws and historically has not, instead 
committing heinous acts against the local 
Malay population. The most recent protests, 
in April 2009, exhibit the weakness of the 
Thai government. Thousands of protestors 
marched on the capital, Bangkok, disrupting 
the New Year festivities and inciting vio-
lence from the police. The protestors are not 
separatist members, but citizens frustrated 
by the corruption and political instability in 
Thailand. The attention now focused on the 
protests once again distracts the government 
from focusing on separatist violence. As 
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 government attempts to control the 
protests, violence mars the southern 
provinces. 
In Thailand, where institutions have 
been largely incapable of keeping up 
with the demand for response from the 
public, when attempts to institute policies 
that would aid the Malay were tried they 
have failed. This is evident historically, as 
no lasting political institutions were created 
in the sixty years since separatist violence 
began with the exception of CPM 43 and the 
SBPAC, and even they were dismantled for 
a period of time. A more recent example can 
be seen in the period following martial law 
in 2004, when the government held elections 
for Tambon councils (local administrative 
bodies) as well as PAOs (Provincial Admin-
istrative Organizations). In theory, this 
would have created power at the local level 
and representation for differing viewpoints 
(i.e. the Malay). Additionally, as 35 percent 
of budgets must be approved by the PAO, it 
would have allowed for Malay representa-
tion on financial matters (Albritton 2005, 
170).  However, by the end of the year the 
results had still not been confirmed by the 
government (Albritton 2005, 171). This pat-
tern of government repression followed by 
attempts at reconciliation, each time too 
weak to reach demands, had repeated itself 
throughout the twentieth century and contin-
ued into the twenty‑first century, each time 
eliciting an angered and violent response 
from the BRN. 
Conversely in the Philippines, insti-
tutions were in place to address the griev-
ances of the people. For example, beginning 
in the 1950s the Filipino government passed 
a series of Land Reform Acts that were 
aimed at ending the cycle of tenant farming 
that was impoverishing the Moro. The origi-
nal Land Reform Acts called for the tenant 
farmer to pay the taxes on the land in order 
to regain the land; however, the amount of 
the taxes owed per parcel of land was an un-
attainable amount for the Moro, and as such 
the acts as they stood aided fewer than 
50,000 people within the first thirty years of 
its passing. However, due to the strong insti-
tutions present in the Philippines there were 
committees and councils through which the 
Moro could explain their concerns. Recent 
Land Reform Acts, in the last decade, have 
been more successful as share tenancy has 
been outlawed and institutions such as the 
Department of Agrarian Reform were estab-
lished to monitor progress and work toward 
greater social justice. 
Analysis  
 After chronicling the development of 
the separatist movements and the govern-
ment responses to them, it is important to 
analyze how government action has affected 
separatist violence. There are two compo-
nents upon which the case studies will be 
analyzed: state capacity and crisis vs. non-
crisis transitions (a theory about democratic 
transitions). State capacity will be used to 
explain government action in Thailand and 
the Philippines from the 1940s to the 1970s, 
while crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used 
to explain government action in the 1980s 
and early 1990s (post–democratic transi-
tion), and both capacity and crisis vs. noncri-
sis theory will be used to explain the current 
separatist situation in each country. 
State capacity refers to the govern-
ments’ ability to enact change, create institu-
tions and infrastructure, and maintain  
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 political stability within the coun-
try. The crisis vs. noncrisis transi-
tion theory, as proposed by Stephen 
Haggard and Robert Kaufman, will be 
applied not to the democratic transitions 
within Thailand and the Philippines 
(though they both fit the model), but instead 
as a guideline through which to characterize 
government responses to separatist violence. 
State Capacity   
 Before their democratic transitions, 
Thailand and the Philippines represented 
different levels of state capacity. Thailand 
had low state capacity, was politically unsta-
ble (frequent military coups) and lacked the 
ability to create meaningful and lasting insti-
tutions. However, the Philippines had high 
state capacity, with routine peace negotia-
tions occurring between the President of the 
Philippines and the leaders of the MNLF 
beginning in 1975. Additionally, the Philip-
pines began land reform acts in the 1960s 
and 1970s to restore the ancestral lands of 
the Moro. 
Thailand suffered from issues sur-
rounding low state capacity, which can be 
compared to theories that were presented in 
Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in 
Changing Societies. Huntington stated that 
as political consciousness increases, as a re-
sult of increased literacy, education, and in-
dustrialization, so too will political demands 
and participation. If a state, in this example 
Thailand, were to be unable to meet those 
expanding political demands, then the state’s 
ability to create new institutions as well as 
the integrity of the current political institu-
tions would be greatly undermined 
(Huntington 2006, 5). This can be seen in 
Thailand from the beginning of the govern-
ment’s reaction to the separatist movement. 
As an attempt at conciliation, the Thai gov-
ernment passed the Patronage of Islam Act 
in 1945. The Act was aimed at addressing 
the complaints of the southern provinces, 
namely the Thai government’s attempts at 
forced assimilation. The act created a posi-
tion within the Thai government for an Is-
lamic advisor, the chularajamontri, to the 
Thai king (Marshallsay 2008, 4). Addition-
ally, shortly after the passing of the Patron-
age of Islam Act, the Thai government al-
lowed Islamic law to be used in four of the 
southern provinces on issues related to heri-
tage and family affairs. However, the Malay 
people did not respond as the Thai govern-
ment expected. The Patronage Act incited 
anger among the Malay, as many thought the 
creation of an advisor on Islamic affairs to 
the king was yet another way for the govern-
ment to monitor and undermine the Malay. 
Additionally, the chularajamontri did not 
come from the southern provinces; instead 
often the chularajamontri came from the 
Bangkok area (Marshallsay 2008, 4). As the 
chularajamontri was in control of the local 
leaders in the southern provinces and was 
their liaison to the central government, this 
only confirmed the Malay suspicion that the 
chularajamontri was not created in order to 
represent their interests, but instead another 
mechanism through which Thai control 
could be established over the Malay.  
Low state capacity prohibited the 
government of Thailand from being able to 
make progress in reducing separatist vio-
lence. What action the government took 
seemed to only further the cause of the sepa-
ratist groups. Due to its low capacity and 
ineffective government action, Thailand 
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 largely relied on the military to 
control the terrorist actions of the 
separatist groups. This is evident by 
the decade‑long emergency called in 
response to the formation of the first 
separatist groups in 1949. Additionally, 
the relative strength of the military in Thai 
society (seven military coups since the be-
ginning of separatist violence) made the 
military the only lasting governmental force 
capable of dealing with separatist violence. 
When government action failed and Thai-
land faced political instability in the 1970s 
(a military coup in 1976 as well as violence 
stemming from the CPT), the government 
created the ISOC to manage separatist vio-
lence. Numerous problems emerged from 
the government’s decision to allow the mili-
tary to handle the separatist movements. The 
military did not have to follow Thai laws; 
this obviously resulted in widespread abuse 
in the southern provinces. Individuals were 
held without charges, people went missing, 
and executions would occur without trials. 
This type of military response did not tem-
per separatist groups; it only helped to fur-
ther their cause with the Malay people. Ad-
ditionally, the military abuses undermined 
the legitimacy of the Thai government and 
failed to encourage political action over 
separatist violence.  
In the Philippines, high state capacity 
worked to foster peace negotiations between 
the government and separatist leaders. As 
stated earlier, President Marcos first met 
with separatist leaders in order to engage in 
peace negotiations and a ceasefire in 1976. 
The ability for a government to effectively 
communicate and negotiate with a terrorist 
group is a large accomplishment. With the 
OIC acting as a mediator, the government of 
the Philippines was able to communicate its 
goals and stance to the separatist leaders and 
vice versa. This form of open dialogue cre-
ated a mechanism through which both par-
ties could air their grievances. Additionally, 
it institutionalized a political mechanism 
through which separatist leaders’ voices 
were heard by top government officials. This 
would establish the beginnings of political 
participation necessary for leaders from the 
MNLF to make the transition to local leaders 
in the ARMM. 
Peace negotiations and ceasefires 
were helpful tools in creating temporary 
peace in the Philippines. However, there has 
yet to be lasting peace as the separatist 
groups, namely the MNLF and the MILF 
more recently, periodically renew violent 
outbursts. This is often done in response to 
an unfavorable result in a referendum or be-
cause the Filipino government fails to act 
fast enough to their demands. The causes of 
this reaction will be discussed in the analysis 
of “moral hazard” as well as the crisis vs. 
noncrisis theory. 
Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory 
Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory, as de-
signed by Stephen Haggard and Robert 
Kaufman, is used to explain democratic tran-
sitions. The theory states that economic and 
social conditions that are present in a coun-
try during its democratic transition will 
shape whether it responds in a crisis or non-
crisis manner. There are several characteris-
tics that are said to be emblematic of crisis 
and noncrisis transitions. In a crisis transi-
tion, the government will act quickly, the 
opposition powers gain greater influence in 
political decisions, and the military and 
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 communist party are weakened. 
According to the theory, a noncrisis 
response looks almost the opposite of 
a crisis response. The government re-
acts slowly to threats and power re-
mains with authoritarian figures, the op-
position has little role in government, and 
the military and communist parties are 
strong within the country (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1997, 269). The theory presented 
is based on governments in transition re-
sponding to economic crisis. Haggard and 
Kaufman use Thailand and the Philippines 
as examples of noncrisis and crisis transi-
tions, respectively, within their theory (270). 
However, these characteristics can also be 
used to explain the Thai and Filipino gov-
ernments’ responses to separatist violence 
after their democratic transitions. 
The Philippines represents a crisis 
transition. This is evident in the govern-
ment’s action toward separatist groups. The 
first criterion of a crisis transition is quick 
government response to an issue. This is evi-
dent in the Philippines in the government’s 
repeated negotiations with separatist leaders. 
Shortly after violence begins, the president 
of the Philippines reengages in negotiations 
with the MNLF leaders in order to success-
fully create a ceasefire and peace agreement. 
There have been over six peace agreements 
since Marcos’s initial dealings with the 
MNLF leaders in 1976. The second criterion 
of a crisis response is increased influence 
given to the opposition power. This is argua-
bly the Philippines largest problem in fight-
ing separatist violence. The government’s 
patterned response of going to the separatist 
leaders in order to create peace agreements 
has given disproportionate power to leaders 
of the MNLF and the MILF. The govern-
ment has already created the ARMM and 
created government positions for separatist 
leaders, and the separatist groups continue to 
demand more from the government. This has 
led to the breakdown of peace in the south as 
the separatist groups seek greater power and 
influence in the country. It appears as if the 
government’s capacity to create peace agree-
ments and ceasefires backfired due to the 
power that it has given the separatist leaders. 
The leaders of the MNLF and the MILF are 
aware that if they seek more from the Fili-
pino government, all they have to do is cre-
ate a violent backlash and the government 
will return with another peace agreement, 
including further provisions to meet their 
demands. As such there is no incentive for 
the separatist groups to uphold the peace 
agreements they enter into, as greater results 
can be garnered through violence. The last 
two criteria, a weak military and communist 
party, are characteristic of the Philippines. 
Additionally, the weakness of these two 
groups has enabled the government to focus 
on the issue of separatist violence, unlike in 
Thailand where political instability due to 
the power of the military and communist 
party has crippled the government’s ability 
to act. 
Thailand is an example of a noncrisis 
response. The government has been slow to 
respond to terrorists. This is for two reasons, 
the government’s inability to act and subse-
quent reliance on the military, and the gov-
ernment’s focus on other issues including 
violence from the communist party and po-
litical instability. Because of this, little po-
litical action was taken to temper separatist 
groups. The power in the Thai government 
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 has remained with the central gov-
ernment due to its noncrisis re-
sponse. The leaders of the BRN/BRN-
C and the PULO are not known in Thai-
land and because of the government’s 
lack of political action, there was no at-
tempt to negotiate with them in the twenti-
eth century. When recent attempts at peace 
negotiations were facilitated by the Thai 
government, the government was so un-
aware of who the separatist leaders were that 
officials met with a secondary separatist 
leader from a group that has long since been 
disbanded. Additionally, the current low ca-
pacity of the government has allowed for a 
resurgence in violence as actions taken in 
part by the government cannot be enforced 
(i.e. the re-installation of CPM 43 and the 
SBPAC). The separatist groups’ secrecy was 
fueled by the government action taken 
against the communist party (as both groups 
retreated into the hills of the southern prov-
inces) as well as by brutal military action. 
This has in part reduced membership in the 
group, as it is difficult for the groups to re-
cruit new members due to their secretive na-
ture and secluded locations. The last two cri-
teria have been shown through government 
action, and the military’s power is evident in 
its task of controlling the southern prov-
inces. The CPT clearly exhibited a great deal 
of power, as the threat of the CPT was seen 
as greater than the threat of the BRN or the 
BRN-C by the Thai government. This is evi-
dent by the government focusing its atten-
tions on the CPT as opposed to the separatist 
groups. While the Thai government’s non-
crisis response has effectively managed ten-
sions (with the exception of periodic vio-
lence) and limited the size and scope of 
separatist membership, it has not been able 
to mediate separatist violence when it does 
occur. The military has only been able to 
suppress the violence, not stop it. Once sepa-
ratist violence begins, the Thai government 
does not have the mechanisms and institu-
tions in place to arbitrate the conflict. 
Issues for Future Peace in Thailand and 
the Philippines  
 Both Thailand and the Philippines will need 
to alter their policies toward separatist 
movements, for either country to be success-
ful in ending separatist violence. In Thai-
land, the historically weak central govern-
ment has resulted in the use of military re-
sponses to separatist violence and at times 
full military control of the south. In the Phil-
ippines, the strength of the central govern-
ment coupled with international support 
from the OIC has led to multiple peace ne-
gotiations and ceasefires. However, the gov-
ernment’s failure to impose strict conse-
quences for violations of the peace agree-
ments has created a pattern of violence, 
through which the separatist groups have 
gained greater power over the central gov-
ernment. 
Issues in Thailand: Stability and 
Diplomacy 
 As noted previously, the central gov-
ernment of Thailand continues to struggle to 
establish political stability. Currently, pro-
tests rage in the capital in response to the 
recent elections. Until the government can 
create lasting stability, including open and 
free elections, the government will remain 
unable to respond diplomatically to separa-
tist threats. The Thai government’s historical 
reliance on the military to control separatist 
violence has led to widespread military 
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 abuses and has left separatist mem-
bers with no political avenues 
through which to express their griev-
ances. 
Even if the current government of 
Thailand were to sign a peace agreement 
with separatist leaders (providing the gov-
ernment could effectively find the leaders of 
the main separatist groups, the BRN and the 
PULO), the agreements may be of little con-
sequence as the government’s legitimacy is 
in question. Also, the ability of the govern-
ment to follow through on any agreement 
would be unlikely. For Thailand to establish 
political stability, greater transparency and 
institutions that are viewed as legitimate by 
the public will need to be put into place. The 
beginning of this was seen in the 1980s and 
1990s in Thailand, when there was increased 
political participation and political aware-
ness. It is not uncommon for a country un-
dergoing a democratic transition to experi-
ence increased violence and instability, as 
has been the case in Thailand. If Thailand 
could reestablish the level of progress it pos-
sessed in the 1980s and 1990s, then steps 
toward reducing separatist violence could be 
taken. This occurred briefly with the crea-
tion of the SBPAC and CPM 43 in 1981. 
Without diplomatic action, the abuses that 
occur under full military control will only 
help to further the separatist cause. Addi-
tionally, as is occurring presently in Thai-
land, when there is dissatisfaction in the 
country (protestors as well as separatist vio-
lence), the government will not have the 
mechanisms in place with which to diffuse 
the conflict. 
Issues in the Philippines: Moral Hazard 
 The concept of moral hazard applies 
to the peace negotiations between the Philip-
pines and the MNLF, and more recently the 
MILF. As earlier stated, the separatist 
groups have violated several peace agree-
ments and ceasefires in the last three dec-
ades. The reason for this can be explained 
through moral hazard. Moral hazard can be 
applied to any agreement between two par-
ties; it functions on the principle that parties 
will behave according to costs and benefits. 
When entering into an agreement, if the 
benefits of not following the contract out-
weigh the costs of breaking the agreement, 
then the party may intentionally act in a way 
that violates moral norms or the contract it-
self (Mirrlees 1999). 
In the case of the Filipino separatist 
groups, the first peace agreement, the Tripoli 
Agreement signed in December of 1976, 
there were no provisions put in place that 
would give the MNLF incentives to abide by 
the agreement. There is no mention of reper-
cussions for not following the peace agree-
ment or for breaking the ceasefire. The 
agreement outlines the concessions to be 
made by the Central Government to the 
MNLF, including the creation of an autono-
mous region in the southern provinces, sepa-
rate Sharia courts, guaranteed representation 
for Muslims in the central government as 
well as in all Filipino courts, and amnesty 
for political prisoners and separatist group 
members for crimes committed in the south-
ern provinces (Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines 1976). Concessions to be 
made by the MNLF included only certain 
areas not to be included in the autonomous 
region and a percentage of profits from min-
ing. This agreement conceded to the MNLF 
one of its largest goals, the creation of a 
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 separate autonomous region in the 
south to be governed by Muslims 
according to Islamic law. However, as 
stated, not all of the southern provinces 
were to be included in the autonomous 
region. The MNLF used this as a reason 
to break the agreement and, without penal-
ties for breaking the agreement, incited fur-
ther violence in the southern provinces. This 
led the Central Government to engage in fur-
ther peace negotiations (and concessions) 
with the MNLF and gave the MNLF the 
power and influence it wanted in the Philip-
pines. 
This is obviously problematic for the 
Philippines, despite the government’s ability 
to successfully negotiate with separatist 
leaders; the negotiations are not effective if 
the separatists have no intention or incentive 
to follow the stipulations of the ceasefire. In 
order to create lasting ceasefires that could 
result in an end to separatist violence, the 
government needs to enact stringent penal-
ties for breaking a ceasefire or peace agree-
ment. Furthermore, these repercussions need 
to be written into the peace agreements so 
that they are not merely threats, but legal 
ramifications for failure to uphold a contract. 
Additionally, if the MNLF or the MILF does 
break the peace agreement/ceasefire, the 
consequences laid out by the government 
must be enforced in the fullest capacity. 
Without these consequences, the violence in 
the Philippines will continue to escalate as 
the separatists seek greater power and influ-
ence in the country. 
The only attempt to take such action 
by the Filipino government was with the 
signing of the “Implementing Guidelines on 
the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Trip-
oli Agreement of Peace of 
2001” (Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines 2001). The guidelines estab-
lished actions taken by the MNLF or the 
MILF that would constitute criminal actions 
and violations of the agreements established 
with the Filipino government. This was a 
step forward by the Filipino government in 
asserting its authority over the separatist 
groups and establishing actions that would 
not be tolerated by the government. Addi-
tionally, the presence of U.S. military troops 
in the southern Philippines temporarily 
maintained peace in the region. However, 
the government failed to follow through on 
the guidelines set forth, as within two years 
the government was once again engaging in 
peace negotiations with the separatist 
groups, despite the failure of the separatist 
groups to uphold the guidelines. Addition-
ally, the government has recently attempted 
to sign a peace agreement that would expand 
the size of the ARMM. This only reaffirms 
the process the separatist groups create, cre-
ating greater violence to gain greater re-
wards from the government. 
There are several different ways to 
deal with the problem of moral hazard in the 
Filipino case. The government could simply 
place an ultimatum on the separatist groups, 
that if they do not comply with future peace 
agreements than the government will no 
longer negotiate with them. However, con-
sidering the track record of the Filipino gov-
ernment separatist groups may not take the 
ultimatum seriously. Additionally, if the 
government were to diplomatically cut off 
the separatist leaders, then it would only 
serve to force the separatist groups outside 
of the political system and most likely  
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 increase the violence in the south-
ern provinces. It is a benefit to the 
government that the separatist leaders 
have been able to marginally integrate 
into the political spectrum; it would be 
a mistake to alienate the leaders of these 
movements. 
The government could continue with 
the status quo, in which it is able to procure 
relative peace for a short period of time. 
However, the pattern that has been created 
by the government has already given dispro-
portionate power to the separatist leaders 
and the current position of the government 
does not provide for long‑term solutions to 
the problem of separatist violence. The third 
option available to the government is to take 
a multifaceted approach to the separatists. 
This would include both internal diplomacy, 
international support, and a military re-
sponse to noncooperation. The government 
should continue to meet with separatist lead-
ers; it is its direct link to the motivations and 
demands of the separatist groups. However, 
this does not mean that the government has 
to necessarily continue to sign peace agree-
ments and give concessions to the separatist 
leaders. Due to the creation of the ARMM, 
separatist leaders hold political positions 
through which they can participate in gov-
ernment. The Filipino government should 
encourage participation through governmen-
tal as opposed to extra‑political means. In-
ternational support is necessary due to the 
international support that the MNLF and the 
MILF hold.  Presently, international support 
has been behind the MNLF and the MILF; 
this has put the Filipino government in a de-
fensive position that has only worsened the 
interests of the Philippines in peace negotia-
tions. With the proper international backing, 
the Filipino government can present a 
stronger front at negotiations and have inter-
national backing if military force is neces-
sary against the separatist groups. This can 
also act as a preventative measure, so that 
the separatist groups understand that the 
Filipino government is serious about the 
consequences for breaking a peace agree-
ment or ceasefire. The last component, mili-
tary force, may be necessary if the separatist 
groups continue to be combative. As earlier 
stated, it would be a mistake to cut off the 
separatist groups diplomatically because of 
its important link to the groups’ goals and 
motivations. By setting out specific military 
consequences to not abiding by peace agree-
ments and ceasefires, separatists will have a 
clear understanding of the repercussions of 
violating the agreements. This is more effec-
tive than the current military action, because 
the government has not set guidelines for the 
military initiatives. Instead the military is 
sent to “hunt” down leaders responsible for 
certain events, which turns into several raids 
and deaths, but soon the government is once 
again negotiating with separatist leaders. 
There needs to be a clear plan and goal of a 
military initiative, not simply letting troops 
loose in the southern provinces, which does 
not gain separatist compliance. This last op-
tion seems the most viable for long‑term 
peace. It addresses not only the immediate 
problems of violent outbreaks with military 
intervention, but also the long‑term prob-
lems of separatist noncompliance. This is 
not to say that this plan will create immedi-
ate peace. It is likely that any new initiative 
the government takes against separatist vio-
lence will, in the short run at least, increase 
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 separatist violence. This is because 
the separatists are quite content with 
the status quo, as it benefits them and 
their goals. However, if the government 
can mitigate the short‑term violent re-
sponse and continue with a plan toward 
long‑term peace, then the Philippines will 
be able to temper and hopefully eliminate 
separatist violence. 
Conclusions and Prescriptions 
 The case studies of Thailand and the 
Philippines exemplify differing government 
responses to terrorism. Both Thailand and 
the Philippines experience separatist vio-
lence stemming from minority Muslim eth-
nic groups in the southern regions of the 
countries. However, the governments’ re-
sponses to these separatist threats have 
shaped the current security situations in the 
countries. In Thailand, the country’s low 
capacity forced a reliance on the military to 
control separatist violence. Without re-
straints on the military, few legal implemen-
tations were used in detaining or executing 
prisoners. This abuse contributed to ongoing 
separatist violence. In the Philippines, the 
government’s high capacity allowed for ne-
gotiations with top separatist leaders. How-
ever, without restraints placed on the separa-
tist groups to ensure their upholding of the 
peace agreement, the MNLF and the MILF 
continue to wreak havoc on the southern 
provinces in order to gain greater control of 
the region. 
In this sense, Thailand used only 
military means through which to subdue 
separatist violence due to the inability of the 
government to use diplomatic means; 
whereas in the Philippines, the focus of gov-
ernment action has been through diplomatic 
means (though increased military initiatives 
have been taken recently), but the lack of 
follow‑through by the government to im-
pose strict and meaningful repercussions for 
violating peace agreements has resulted in a 
cycle of violence. 
 In order for lasting peace to be 
achieved by Thailand and the Philippines 
changes, will need to be enacted. In Thai-
land, the first step toward reduced violence 
is strengthening and legitimizing the central 
government. Separatist groups in Thailand 
were largely dormant in the 1980s and 
1990s, when the government was at its peak 
effectiveness. It seems that the separatist are 
willing to accept positive change in the 
country, whether it is political, economic, or 
social. When the government focused on 
domestic issues and not military intervention 
in the south, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, separatist violence was at its lowest 
point, since its beginnings in the 1940s. 
In the Philippines, the government 
needs to create one clear message on how it 
will handle separatist violence. As it stands, 
the government has historically allowed 
separatists to break peace agreements, resort 
to violence, and then gain concessions from 
the government. Only recently has the gov-
ernment expressed what actions would vio-
late peace agreements. Even after the 
“guidelines” were presented, the Filipino 
government met again with separatist lead-
ers two more times, to offer an expansion of 
provinces in the ARMM. These mixed mes-
sages offer no incentive for separatist to co-
operate with the government. Even when the 
government threatens military repercussions, 
the separatist have been willing to deal with 
the military for a short period, knowing 
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 the government will soon offer 
new incentives and peace agree-
ments, as in the 2003 and 2008 peace 
agreements. The Filipino government 
needs to not only set repercussions for 
not following peace agreements, but to 
follow through with these consequences. 
Otherwise, the current cycle of violence and 
then negotiations, with the separatist leaders 
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